Supporting Organizational Accountability inside Multiagent Systems

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Objective
We present and analyze the problem of realizing an accountability-supporting platform in multiagent systems technology. With the aim of achieving accountability as a design property, we provide a few principles that characterize an accountability-supporting multiagent system. We provide, then, an accountability protocol to regulate the interaction between an agent, willing to play a role in an organization, and the organization itself.

Accountability as a Design Property
The concept of accountability requires the presence of a number of attributes. We distill them in the following few founding principles at the basis of the way to achieve organizational accountability as a design property.

Principle 1
All the collaborations and communications subject to considerations of accountability among the agents occur within a single scope that we call organization.

Principle 2
An agent can enroll in an organization only by playing a role that is defined inside the organization.

Principle 3
An agent willing to play a role in an organization must be aware of all the powers associated with such a role before adopting it.

Principle 4
An agent is only accountable, towards the organization or another agent, for those goals it has explicitly accepted to bring about.

Principle 5
An agent must have the leeway for putting before the organization the provisions it needs for achieving the goal to which it is committing. The organization has the capability of reasoning on the requested provisions and can accept or reject them.

Social Commitments
A social commitment models a directed relation between two individuals [1, 2]:

Agent \(x\) commits to agent \(y\) that when condition \(s\) holds, it will bring about \(u\):
- Only the debtor can take on a commitment
- The creditor is not committed to bring about the antecedent
- Commitments are directly manipulable by agents via standard operations

An Accountability Protocol
\(Ag_i\) will commit towards the organization to exercise the powers, given to it by the role, when this will be requested by the legal relationships it will create towards other agents:

\[
\begin{align*}
&cpwr_{R1} : C(Ag_i, Org, C(Aq_i, Z_1, pwr_{R1}, pwr_{R1})) \\
&\vdots \\
&cpwr_{Rm} : C(Ag_i, Org, C(Aq_i, Z_m, pwr_{Rm}, pwr_{Rm}))
\end{align*}
\]

An agent willing to play a role is expected to create a commitment that takes the form:

\[
\begin{align*}
&cpwr_R : C(Ag_i, Org, accept_player_{Org}(Ag_i, R), cpwr_{R1} \land \cdots \land cpwr_{Rm})
\end{align*}
\]

Org, then, promises to assign some goal to some agent should the agent accept to commit to pursue the goal:

\[
\begin{align*}
&cass_{Ri} : C(Ag_i, Org, c_g_{i,1} \land prov_{Ri} \land assign_{Org}(Ag_i, g_{i,1})) \\
&\vdots \\
&cass_{Rn} : C(Ag_i, Org, c_g_{i,n} \land prov_{Rn} \land assign_{Org}(Ag_i, g_{i,n}))
\end{align*}
\]

The resulting protocol is as follows:

1. create\((cpwr_R)\)
2. accept_player\(_{Org}(Ag_i, R)\)
3. create\((cpwr_{R1}), \ldots, create(cpwr_{Rm})\)
4. create\((cass_{R,i}), k = 1, \ldots, n\)
5. create\((c_g_{i,k}), k = 1, \ldots, n\)
6. assign\(_{Org}(Ag_i, g_{i,k}), k = 1, \ldots, n\)
7. prove\(_{R,i}, k = 1, \ldots, n\)
8. achieve\(_{Ag}(g_{i,k}), k = 1, \ldots, n\)

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References